This project will examine the welfare implications of firms choosing to merge after participating in a cartel. We aim to understand whether firms are likely to merge as a response to a specific market environment and possible past collusive behavior. If a merger involves at least a discovered cartel member, then it may occur for anti-competitive reasons, in order to control a large market share and thus continue to ensure the high prices previously charged during the collusive agreement, and not to create a synergy that improves efficiency. In addition, a newly merged firm is not considered as a cartel recidivist.
This empirical project will use two unique datasets on legal cartels in Sweden, and on mergers and merger notifications.
A 2.1 level 8 honours degree or higher in a relevant degree
Scholarship not available. Fees & Materials to be paid by the student. Materials costs not significant.
If you are interested in submitting an application for this project, please complete an Expression of Interest.
Applications submitted without an EOI form will not be considered.